Showing posts with label scoping study. Show all posts
Showing posts with label scoping study. Show all posts

Monday, November 8, 2010

Ventana Gold (VEN.to) upped to spec buy at TD Sec

Wanna know what Daniel Earle thinks about today's Ventana Gold (VEN.to) news? Click this link and download your own copy of his analysis, but here's the headline blurb that comes with it.

Ventana released the much anticipated results of the Scoping Study and resource estimate for its wholly-owned La Bodega gold project in northern Colombia this morning.
Scoping Study highlights:
 
-Initial inferred resource of 3.5mm oz Au (range of 3mm oz to 6.7mm oz depending on cut-off selected), 19mm oz Ag, 85mm lbs Cu
-Start-up capital costs of US$297mm (incremental US$169mm over LOM)
-14 year mine life with planned production at 7500 tpd
-Average production of 301,000 oz/yr Au at net cash costs of US$322/oz over first 6 years
-Reported pre-tax NAV5% of US$807mm with IRR of 34% at metal prices of US$1000/oz Au , US $17/oz Ag, and US$3.00/lb Cu
 
It is difficult to gauge Street expectations as the company has a limited following. However, the figures presented above taken together are broadly inline with our expectations, with the project being smaller at this time but also more profitable than we had anticipated.
 
We believe this sets a baseline upon which the company can expand and improve the project. Moreover, we believe this milestone may mark the emergence of the company from a long period of underperformance typical of companies during the feasibility stage of their life cycle.

As such, we are upgrading the stock to Speculative BUY (from Hold) and increasing our Target Price to $16/share (from $14).

IKN back. Earle was early and good on the VEN story in '09 but just recently has been fiddling around with his call and got a bit too cute for his own good by downgrading to hold just a couple of weeks ago. Nice to see he's back with the right call on VEN now. DYODD, dude.

Monday, July 26, 2010

NPVs, discounted cash flows, things like that

Wonk out! Here's an excerpt from IKN64 out yesterday that sampled the fun and laughter world of mine project economics. Posted up here on the blog by request from a subscriber (who'd like to show his non-subbing friend the piece). No probs 'GS', enjoy.

Talking discounted post-tax cash flows

In ‘Market Watching’ below, as well as in the two reports prepared by other analysts attached with today’s issue, we take a look at the new PEA published by Antares Minerals (ANM.v) last week (1). But before getting there I’d like to focus on one element of the PEA news release as it gives us some insight into the way junior miners often present their case as an investment vehicle in the rosiest manner possible; in fact it’s one that I believe to be irresponsible to the point of plain deception. We’re going to use ANM’s news release to highlight this because (and be very clear on this), ANM is one of the good guys, it’s doing the right thing by the market and investors and not trying to deceive anyone. This is probably due to a combination of the good, honest, straight-shooting people that run the company coupled with the fact that the Haquira deposit is so darned good it doesn’t need any extra dressing to prove itself to numbers people. It points back to the basic reasons why we recommend the stock as a ‘Top Pick’, too.


Here below are two tables pasted from the NR that show the Cash Flow models for Haquira. Before diving in we need to keep in mind that a PEA is not a definitive study and any of the current metrics being used by ANM might change by the time production day one comes around, but for the purposes of modelling we have to start somewhere so the things used by ANM (20 year mine life, 100k tpd flotation throughput, 30ktpd SX-EW throughput, 2:1 strip, 89c cash costs over first ten year etc etc etc on a hundred other variables) are taken as our fair baseline.


I’ve highlighted a couple of the numbers and titles in red to help with the explanation which you can refer to at your leisure (I won’t be discussing them all here). But the main one to bear in mind is the $1,069m cash flow number in the first table. This is the one presented by ANM in its news release headline that gives us the 16.4% Internal Rate of Return (IRR), the one that assumes a base case for the metal ($2.25/lb Cu) and also an 8% discount to the Net Project Value (NPV) of Haquira.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copper Price US$/lb Cu
-----------------------------------------------------
3 yr
Post-Tax historical
Cash Flow Base trailing
(US$ millions) Case avg
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1.75 $2.00 $2.25 $2.50 $2.75 $2.95 $3.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 0% $1,424 $2,667 $3,911 $5,154 $6,398 $7,393 $7,641
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 5% $337 $1,069 $1,800 $2,531 $3,263 $3,848 $3,994
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 8% ($38) $516 $1,069 $1,623 $2,177 $2,620 $2,730
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 10% ($219) $248 $714 $1,180 $1,647 $2,020 $2,113
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 12% ($361) $37 $434 $831 $1,228 $1,545 $1,625
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
IRR% 7.6% 12.4% 16.4% 20.0% 23.2% 25.7% 26.3%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payback (yrs) 7.4 yrs 5.7 yrs 4.8 yrs 4.2 yrs 3.8 yrs 3.6 yrs 3.5 yrs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copper Price US$/lb Cu
-----------------------------------------------------
3 yr
Pre-Tax historical
Cash Flow Base trailing
(US$ millions) Case avg(i)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1.75 $2.00 $2.25 $2.50 $2.75 $2.95 $3.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 0% $2,217 $4,148 $6,079 $8,010 $9,941 $11,486 $11,872
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 5% $846 $1,981 $3,117 $4,253 $5,389 $6,297 $6,524
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 8% $359 $1,218 $2,078 $2,938 $3,797 $4,485 $4,657
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 10% $119 $844 $1,568 $2,292 $3,016 $3,596 $3,741
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NPV 12% (70.3) $546 $1,163 $1,779 $2,396 $2,889 $3,012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
IRR% 11.2% 17.5% 22.7% 27.4% 31.6% 34.9% 35.6%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base Case = Industry analysts long term consensus price of US$2.25/lb Cu

(i) Three year historical trailing average for LME price of copper = US$2.95/lb Cu

Before continuing, let’s talk about why the “discount to NPV” (those lines like “NPV 8%, for example) exists. A way of presenting this is to imagine Person X investing a sum, let’s say one million dollars, in an investment that promises him or her $1.5m in a few year’s time (let’s say five years). Now that might look at first sight as if X will make a 50% profit, but if s/he hadn’t sunk $1m into the project it could have been used for something less risky but still lucrative. The typical counter-example is to imagine that $1m being put into government bonds or a time deposit that pays (again let’s say) a safe and steady 4% annual interest compounded. At the end of those five years, the $1m would become $1.217m once interest had been added and compounded. So the $500,000 nominal profit is really $283,000, which is a lot less.


The difference in those two results is a “risk premium”. If person X wants to put $1m into a relatively safe place, then $217,000 profit is the result. But choose a riskier invetsment and the return is higher ($500,000). It’s then up to the person to decide whether the extra reward is worth the extra risk (the same way as we equities investors make risk/reward decisions, often on a more intuitive level).


There is a second idea related to the NPV discount, which is related to the first but needs a note. The so-called “time value of money” theory notes that people prefer to have cash in hand than locked up over a period in time in any investment (be they safe ones like bonds or risker ones like mining). Therefore the potential investor needs to be compensated for their waiting by a monetary profit. There’s no need to go into the mathematics (it’s a bit technical but nothing on Einstein levels), just to understand that the theory takes into account that future profits aren’t just desirable, but actively demanded by the investor. It’s capitalism, folks.


So once those two concepts are taken into account, it makes much more sense for a company such as Antares to present its project economics using a discounted NPV. In mining circles, there’s a convention to use an 8% NPV which most players most of the time consider a fair benchmark (again, let’s speak very very roughly and say “5% for the time deposit interest, 3% as simple reward for waiting” to get a handle on things).


Now to the point I wanted to make about the ANM news release and project economics: ANM could have chosen a sexier copper price to present its economics. It could have chosen a lower discount rate. Also, it could have used a typical trick used by other miners and presented its economics on a pre-tax basis (just check the differences in those charts, especially when the NPV discount is higher). But it didn’t. It chose to pitch its headline using a low copper price, a industry-understood 8% discount and all on a post-tax, post-royalty, post-worker profit sharing participation (that’s 8% in Peru) basis. Also, on talking to CEO John Black yesterday I was told that the PEA added a 20% contingency price to every single line item, which is somewhat unusual in mining circles as a typical (and accepted) approach would be to add 20% contingency to some things but nail specific prices on other things that the company believes can be priced pretty accurately, even at this early stage.


All these conservative parameters and the IRR still comes out at 16.4%, the project shows robust economics and Haquira clearly “works” as a mine. So thanks to this modest, conservative approach used by ANM we can take this PEA as a solid and true baseline and assume that anything that affects project economics will affect it to the upside...it’s all blue sky from here, folks.


Now we have that out there, check how this news release (2) published by South American Silver (SAC.to) presented the PEA for its ‘Mallku Khota’ silver/indium project to the world in 2009. Here’s the first paragraph:


February 25, 2009

South American Silver Corp. (“SASC” or the “Company”) announces the results of a NI 43-101 compliant Preliminary Economic Assessment Study (“PEA”) on its 100% owned Malku Khota silver – indium - gold project located in central Bolivia. The study includes a Base Case with a pre-tax undiscounted NPV of US$1,233 Million (0% discount rate) and IRR 50.7%.


It also goes with using the “three year trailing prices” for silver and indium, its key project byproduct. Hopefully you can see the problem here but if not, reflect that if ANM.v had used to same cherrypicked criteria as SAC.to in its news release, it could have run with a project cash flow of $11.486Bn in its headline instead of the $1.069Bn it preferred. TEN TIMES HIGHER!


Yes SAC.to is one of my bugbear stocks on the blog, but it’s not chosen as an object of derision just because I don’t like the company logo. Aside from all the issues it has with its main country of operation (Bolivia) it tries to present project economics in a way that’s so misleading it should be outright banned by the financial authorities. SAC isn’t the only company out there that does this kind of financial manipulation...not by a long chalk. But it’s a good example and one that you can use as your counterpoint when checking out PEAs PFSs and FFS in the future. When it comes to mine economics, the devil is in the details.

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

George Salamis, President of Rusoro (RML.v), talks to IKN

Nice teeth, nice tie, nice arty photo. Whatever happened to

grimy, dirty unkempt geologists, anyway?




As I mentioned yesterday I was mystified, even taking into account "The Venezuela Factor", that the very positive news release from Rusoro (RML.v) wasn't greeted with more enthusiasm by the market. So being a humble corner of cyberspace that doesn't mope around and prefers to actually do things, yesterday afternoon I got in contact with George Salamis, President of RML.v, and asked him a few questions about the PR (as having once done a longer interview with the dude and all that). Below is the Q&A I had with him. Enjoy.



xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

IKN: What does this scoping study mean to Rusoro?

George Salamis: The Choco 10 expansion scoping study means a lot to us and clearly defines our value to be unlocked. To me, an alternate headline for this morning’s press release would read: “Attention to all mining investors and gold-lovers: Projected NPV’s for Choco 10 alone shown to be triple our current market capitalization”. This isn’t fiction, this is fact. The outcome of this scoping study shows that the combination of an expanded Choco 10 mine and a fully developed Increible 6 gold deposit creates an immense value driving opportunity for our shareholders. These two deposits, together, are company-makers by anyone’s measure. Gold deposits capable of sustaining 500,000 ozs per year, at a relatively low forecasted operating cost and non-nosebleed capital expenditure levels, are extremely rare. There aren’t many large undeveloped gold deposits left on the planet that come with sub-$300 million construction price-tags, as anyone at Barrick, Gold Fields, Anglo Gold or Goldcorp would attest to.



IKN: Personally I found it very positive news, however market reaction was rather flat on Tuesday. Any thoughts about that?

GS: Indeed, this scoping study news was extremely positive; Net Present Values in the $450 million to $740 million range depending on gold prices, projected rates of return above 50%. All very positive news and certainly the Choco 10 expansion scoping study has presented the most economically robust forecast of any mining project that I’ve ever been a part of.

Someone said the other day that Rusoro had become the Rodney Dangerfield of the mining world, “….Can’t get no respect”! I had a good chuckle from this analogy. What I can say from experience is that once the magnitude of this scoping study news is allowed to simmer in the market, this perception will change.

One unnamed journalist was brave enough to mention Km88, Las Cristinas and our Choco 10 scoping study, in the same sentence no less, in a question to me this morning, as in “Your scoping results are good, but surely what you have at Choco 10 and Increible 6 doesn’t stack up to Crystallex’s Las Cristinas gold project”. Well surely it does stack up to Las Cristinas and any other undeveloped world-class ore-body. I reminded said misguided journalist that 1) on an annualized production basis, during our projected life-of-mine schedule, we are projected to produce a lot more gold – 2 to 3 times more - compared to what’s forecasted at Cristinas or any of the other Km88 gold deposits, 2) our estimated head-grades are easily twice that of Las Cristinas and 3) at Choco 10, we’d be expanding off of a mine that already exists and is successfully producing gold now, whereas Cristinas would involve a completely new build, from scratch, at about twice the CAPEX estimated compared to our Choco 10 expansion.

Don’t get me wrong, I think Las Cristinas is a great ore-body, also world-class. Crystallex’s management have done a great job of advancing it to feasibility as did Placer Dome before them (a shameful plug for my old alma mater who also did some excellent work down there). The mining world has this warped fascination with the trials and tribulations of Km88 and I guess it’s because of the 15 plus years of controversy and excessive turf battles surrounding these projects. It’s always frustrating to witness the investor focus on Km88 and related negativity, in contrast to the great things that we have done in the El Callao district at Choco and Increible (and Isidora) during the last year on the gold production and operational end; increasing gold production, lowering costs, many positive changes meriting positive attention.



IKN: Is the growth time schedule to reach 500,000oz Au production feasible right now?

GS: This time schedule is achievable, however we’d have to hit the mark, timewise, on everything that needs to be done in terms of feasibility, permitting and financing for the Choco 10 expansion to 500,000 ozs or more of annual production. This includes resource to reserve conversion by doing detailed in-fill drilling, new resource estimates, detailed engineering studies, environmental studies, etc. We have a lot on our plates and by spelling all this out in a few sentences, I am by no means trivializing the task at hand. Fortunately, Choco 10 is an existing mine located on a permitted mine site, thus we’d expect that permitting the mine and mill expansion would not involve any significant hurdles. And then there’s financing, whereby one could potentially envisage the inclusion of some debt financing, given that our aim is to produce a bankable feasibility study in the end of the day. One should expect that it would be a lot easier to finance a new mine expansion under management with a proven production track record, a proven track record in working successfully with relevant permitting authorities and an outfit who has the Venezuelan government as a significant partner at one of their other gold mines. Anyway, one step at a time Otto, first we start with the in-fill drilling campaign and then move on from there.



IKN: What of Venezuela? All the world is hearing about nationalizations, expropriated properties and companies etc. The general view is that Venezuela is running out of finances and will take over any foreign company that dares to make a profit. Does this concern you?

GS: This is not of concern to us, but it is of obvious concern to mining investors who attribute such a considerable discount to our stock, relative to other gold producers. This is sad really, because the Venezuelan government has been extremely cooperative with us, be it in the management of our 50/50 mining joint venture with them, Venrus, or in the permitting of new projects. When we have had minor disputes in the past with the government, we have always resolved them quickly and amicably. In the entire history of our existence, we cannot point to one incident where we feel the Venezuelan government has short changed Rusoro or have tried to seize assets from us. I can’t see it happening, ever. Can I state this any more categorically? We don’t see nationalization or expropriation as a significant risk for Rusoro and its shareholders. As I’ve said before the perception of political risk, for us, resides only in the market.



IKN: We know that "the Russian connection" is strong in Rusoro, especially with the recent additions of two more Russian nationals to the management team. The perception is also that Russians have an advantage in running a business in the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez. How much do you agree or disagree with that?

GS: The Russian connection is strong in Rusoro and, indeed, having Russians working side by side with our senior Venezuelan management is a definite advantage. In addition to the recent Russian executive management appointments, we employ a lot of very skilled Russian mining engineers, metallurgists and geologists on the ground in Venezuela, in addition to a few Cuban professionals. So “yes” Otto, I strongly agree. We would not have made the tremendous strides that we have in gold mining, in Venezuela, without this.



IKN: I was sent a report with a call recommending RML today that contained the following extract.



Rusoro today released the results of a Preliminary Assessment, also known in the mining industry as a Scoping Study, completed by top-tier mining consultant Micon International. The Study uses US$700/oz gold for its base case, which we will also use in our assumptions, as Rusoro receives a 15-17% discount to the world spot price from the Venezuelan government.



So the question is, is it true RML is paid at a discount to spot for gold produced?

GS: We do indeed sell our gold at a discount to spot gold rates as other producers, past and present, have done in Venezuela for the past several years. This discount is imposed on sales by the numerous licensed gold buying entities who we do business with in-country. Our audited financial statements show these discounts as a cost of sales. This is a fact of life for all of those who produce gold in Venezuela.

IKN: When can we expect 1q09 results, George?

GS: Soon.



IKN: Thanks George.



GS: No problem