With the results just in, pro-Chavez has won 17 of the 22 states, anti-Chavez has won 3 states and there are 2 states still unannounced (Táchira and Carabobo). With friends I made a guess that he'd lose 6......he lost a min of 3 and a max of 5.
However it's not all bad for the Chávez opposition not by a long way. Significantly, anti-Chavez has won the mayor's seat in Caracas (Antonio Ledezma), along with the hotly contested Zulia region. Miranda is also in the loss column for Hugo. All in all (and it may be early to call it), but the whole thing has a feeling of "honours even". Chávez gets the vast majority of states, and Anti-Chávez wins the two most populous regions. Hey, cool...something for everyone! Isn't that what democracy's all about?
Here are all the results with 95.67% of votes counted, with the anti-Chávez winning candidates in bold type.
Trujillo: Hugo Cabezas 59.47%, Enrique Catalán 27%
Sucre: Enrique Maestre 56.08%, Eduardo Morales Gil 42.62%
Anzoátegui: Tarek Willian Saab 55.06%, Gustavo Marcano 40.50%
Municipio Libertador: Jorge Rodríguez 53.05%, Stalin González 41.92%
Alcaldía Metropolitana: Antonio Ledezma 52.45%, Aristóbulo Istúriz 44.92%
And now it's all over, all we need to do is sit through a bunch of "we won and you lost, suckaz" and fraud accusations from both sides and then the whole thing will die down. In the last couple of weeks I've noted the English speaking media's line that Hugo has bet the farm on these vital yada yada, but sad to say it's just not true; it was just a bit of spin to sell a story.
Like I said before, to the disappointment of many these elections are not that important and will change nothing.
El Chiguire Bipolar* reports that long queues are forming at the electronic voting booths because people have noticed you can also play Pac-Man on the machines.
All hail the mighty Chiguire. I'm not going to steal any more of the rodent's wonderful images. Go visit the site yourself.
The elections are on today! And rather than give my kinda tepid and snarky version about what might happen, it's time to hand over to some experts. BBO financial services is run by Chávez opposition (such as Miguel Octavio, the guy behind the blog 'the devil's excrement'), but no matter, because every week they publish a round up of Venezuelan affairs that's not much more balanced than anything blogged, but useful and fact laden all the same.
This week they added a preview to today's elections to their note, and in my humble opinon it sums up things pretty well. So here's the section of the report. Enjoy.
On Sunday, Venezuelans will go to the polls and vote for 22 Governors (all but AmazonasState), 328 Mayors and all of the State Legislators. After Chávez’ loss in the Constitutional referendum last year, Sunday’s election will have a crucial role in the future of the country, as it may define whether President Hugo Chávez presses or not for a new Constitutional referendum to allow him to be reelected indefinitely. Additionally, were Chávez to score a victory, it will allow him to push forward his revolutionary program.
In the end, the winner on Sunday may be determined more by which side sells the outcome better, rather than who is the actual winner in terms of the number of votes, municipalities or governors obtained. Clearly, President Chávez has an edge on this, given that it is expected that he will win a majority of the 22 states up for grabs and he is definitely a great salesman of illusions. However, he is likely to lose a number of states to the opposition, which currently only holds two of them (Nueva Esparta and Zulia), as well as to dissident Chavistas, running independent candidacies against those of his PSUV party.
The opposition may be too confident coming in to Sunday. Last year’s referendum victory may not easily translate into a victory on Sunday. Chávez’ popularity has actually picked up since that vote, as the food shortages that plagued the country
in the second half of 2007 have disappeared and the opposition, while achieving a semblance of unity, still did not manage to present a single front in many states, even if it did a better job than everyone expected.
Chávez has run the campaign as if he was the candidate, roaming the country with a very aggressive speech, the real candidates hidden in the background. What is unknown is how much of this he can actually pass on to his candidates, some of whom are not only somewhat lackluster, but in some cases even Chávez’ support towards them seemed to be lukewarm.
It will be abstention that is likely to decide many races, a parameter that local pollsters have always had a hard time predicting well. Some argue that the three million supporters Chávez had in his 2006 reelection, who failed to vote in the 2007 referendum will vote this time, but it is unclear to us that if Chávez’ machinery motivates these voters, that they will actually follow the party line.
This is the way we see the possible outcome at this time, based on conversations with experts and polls:
---The opposition
In the end we expect the opposition to show significant gains in this election, but it is unclear whether it can sell it to the electorate well. Chávez on the other hand, will claim a huge victory in most scenarios, even if he understands that the results represent a significant setback for him.
At this time, the opposition appears likely to have clear victories in Nueva Esparta and Zulia, the two states currently in its hands, but it will add Tachira, Carabobo and Sucre with certainty. Miranda State also looks like it will likely tilt towards the opposition, as the race is close, but Chavista Governor Diosdado Cabello seems to have too high of level of
rejection to turn it around and the possible victory of the opposition in the Sucre municipality, may make the difference in the Miranda Governor’s race.
Beyond this, the opposition may score victories in Mérida, Yaracuy, Cojedes and Falcón, but no more than that. Thus, we look for the opposition to win five Governorships and maybe, just maybe, add some from the remaining four possible states.
---Dissident Chavismo
From an image point of view, Chávez will have to deal with dissident Chavistas taking at least three states: Guárico, Trujillo and Barinas, with a chance that Portuguesa will also go for them. The latter is something some are suggesting, but would definitely surprise us. But at least two of these are certain and if Chávez’ PSUV were to lose his home state of Barinas, it will certainly represent a blow to his image, given that his own brother is the candidate there.It is certainly remarkable that Chávez may lose from two to three of the states of the “llanos” of Venezuela, once the bastion of his powerbase and his own birthplace.
---Chavismo
The opposition may have lost a huge opportunity in Bolivar State, where it failed to reach an agreement to run a single candidate, which would have likely given it the win, but now the state is solidly in the Chavista column, much like Anzoategui, Aragua, Delta Amacuro, Apure, Lara, Monagas and Vargas. Thus, eight states are solidly in Chávez’ column. Note however, that only three of them are highly populated with Chavismo dominating in the poor and sparsely populated states.
Summarizing, we see eight states going for Chávez’ PSUV, six for the opposition and three for dissident Chavismo, with the remainder too close to call, but likely to go for Chavismo if abstention is not low.
Add to this the Mayor of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, which we see going to the opposition and carries a lot of weight from the point of view of claiming victory and any opposition victory in the states which are too close to call could easily shift the tide against Chávez proclaiming victory. Once again, it will be abstention which will determine the probability of this happening, as the opposition voters seem better motivated than those of PSUV.
Finally, while many observers dismiss fraud and manipulation as unlikely, the final results on Sunday could be heavily disputed and lead to confrontation. People should remember that while Chávez did lose the Constitutional Referendum last year, the final and detailed results were never revealed by the Electoral Board despite the protests of the opposition and the fact that it is simply a violation of the law.
This puts into question the ability of the opposition to either request a recount or ask for the publication of the final results in states where the race may be too close or disputed.
Now that little vote thingy is out the way up North and the Hawaiian got the job, eyes will turn to the Venezulan regional elections on the 23rd November. Here's the essential guide:
The vote is to elect governors for the 22 regions of Venezuela and for local seats as well.
The press will tell you something about it being a 'test for the Chávez gov't' and attempt to whip up a polemic about how his power is fading or somesuch.
Of the 22 regions, Chávez supporters look good for 16 wins. Two regions will almost certainly go against the gov't. Four are in the balance.
This counters both sides' views, with the opposition saying they're good for eight or nine regions. The gov't promises (in Bloomberg expect the word "threatens" at this point) to win the whole country by landslide. Or in other words samo samo.
There are eight regions that hold 70% of Venezuela's population. Unsurprisingly these are the most hotly contested.
Chávez has been mixing it with Manuel Rosales, governor of the state of Zulia recently. This is because if Rosales loses Chávez knocks out one of his most vociferous political enemies. If Rosales wins nobody will be surprised and Chávez has nothing to lose on the deal.
The most important point: Despite all you'll hear between now and November 23rd, NOTHING WILL CHANGE IN VENEZUELA AFTER THESE ELECTIONS.
This is a set of local elections that will be won and lost on local issues. Some guy's plan to fill in all the neighbourhood potholes will win more votes than any rallying cry around some revolutionary or counterrevolutionary flag. This is why this is IKN's last post on the regionals before results night. It really is a non-issue for anyone outside Venezuela. Sorry to disappoint.
